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ABSTRACT
Annotating blockchains with auxiliary data is useful for many ap-
plications. For example, e-crime investigations of illegal Tor hidden
services, such as Silk Road, often involve linking Bitcoin addresses,
from which money is sent or received, to user accounts and related
online activities. We present BlockTag, an open-source tagging sys-
tem for blockchains that facilitates such tasks. We describe Block-
Tag’s design and present three analyses that illustrate its capabilities
in the context of privacy research and law enforcement.
1 INTRODUCTION
Public blockchains contain valuable data describing financial trans-
actions. For example, Bitcoin’s raw blockchain data alone is 160 GB
as of March 2018, and is growing rapidly. This data holds the key to
understanding different aspects of cryptocurrencies, including their
privacy and market dynamics. Blockchain analysis systems, such
as BlockSci [17], have enabled blockchain science by addressing
three pain points, namely poor performance, limited capabilities,
and a cumbersome programming interface.
Overview. Wepresent BlockTag, a tagging system for blockchains.
BlockTag uses vertical crawlers to automatically annotate blockchain
data with tags, mappings between block, transaction, or address
identifiers and auxiliary data describing the tagged identifiers. For
example, the system can tag Bitcoin address with the Twitter user
account of its owner. BlockTag also provides a novel blockchain
query interface with advanced capabilities, such as clustering, link-
ing and searching, which are important for privacy research and
law enforcement. For example, BlockTag provides best-effort an-
swers to high-level queries in Bitcoin e-crime investigations, such
as “which Twitter user accounts paid ≥ B10.0 to Silk Road in 2014.”
Design. We start with the observation that most blockchain anal-
ysis systems transform raw blockchain data into a stripped-down,
simple data structure that can fit in or map tomemory. Therefore, in-
formation auxiliary to core transaction data, such as scripts, hashes,
or annotations in general, cannot be part of this data structure and
must have their own mappings. This naturally leads to a layered
system architecture, where a tagging layer sits on top of an analysis
layer, with a well-defined and extendable interface between them,
as shown in Figure 1. In our implementation, we chose BlockSci as
a blockchain analysis system because it is hundreds times faster
than its contenders. Moreover, BlockSci exposes a programming
interface in C++ to extend its core analysis library, along with a
Python wrapper for defining high-level analytical tasks.
BlockTag is shipped with batteries included. First, it implements
four vertical crawlers that are configured to annotate Bitcoin ad-
dresses with three types of tags: user tags representing BitcoinTalk1
and Twitter user accounts, service tags representing service providers
1https://bitcointalk.org
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Figure 1: Layered blockchain system architecture.
that are indexed by Ahmia2 search engine, and text tags represent-
ing user-generated textual labels submitted to Blockchain.info.3
Second, BlockTag is not limited to Bitcoin. The vertical crawlers can
be configured to scrape auxiliary data of other cryptocurrencies,
including Litecoin, Namecoin, and Zcash. Smart contract platforms,
such as Ethereum and EOS, are outside our scope. Third, BlockTag
extends BlockSci’s analysis library and implements a programming
interface that enables analysts to query transactions by their prop-
erties, including tags. Fourth, BlockTag allows analysts to manually
annotate blockchains with custom tags at the block, transaction,
and address level.
Analysts start blockchain investigations using a Jupyter note-
book that imports BlockTag’s Python package. The package exposes
a chain object representing the blockchain. Each block, transaction,
and address has a tags object mapping it to some JSON-serializable
auxiliary data. Selecting, grouping, and aggregating transactions is
straightforward and is provided through a simple query interface.
Deployment. We deployed BlockTag on a single, private, server-
grade machine in January 2018 for about three months. As of March
2018, the crawlers have ingested about 5B tweets, 2.2M BitcoinTalk
user profiles, 1.5K Tor onion pages, and 30K Blockchain.info labels.
This has resulted in 45K user, 88 service, and 29K text tags.
Applications. We demonstrate BlockTag’s novel capabilities with
three applications, focusing on Bitcoin and Tor hidden services.
1) Linking:We show it is relatively easy to link users of social net-
works to Tor hidden services through Bitcoin payments. We were
able to link 125 user accounts to 20 service providers, which include
illegal and controversial ones, such as Silk Road and The Pirate Bay.
While one may expect a better level of privacy when using Bitcoin,
we recall that it is pseudo-anonymous by design and lacks retroac-
tive operational security, as described by Satoshi [22]. From a law
2https://ahmia.fi
3https://blockchain.info
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enforcement perspective, BlockTag offers a valuable capability that
is useful in e-crime investigations. In particular, showing a provable
link between a user account on a website and illegal activities on
the Dark Web can be used to secure a subpoena to collect more
information about the user from the website’s operator [27].
2) Market economics:We analyze the market of Tor hidden ser-
vices by calculating their “balance sheets.” We show that WikiLeaks
is the highest receiver of payments in terms of volume, with 26.4K
transactions. In terms of total value of incoming payments, however,
Silk Road tops the list with more than B29.6K received on its ad-
dress. We also observe that the money flowing in and out of service
addresses is nearly the same. This suggests that service providers
do not keep their Bitcoins on the same address they use for receiv-
ing payments, but rather distribute them to other addresses. Third,
from the last transaction dates of these addresses, we found that
all but three of the top-10 revenue making service providers are
active in 2018. This, however, does not mean the three services have
stopped making Bitcoin transactions, as the service providers might
have used different addresses that the crawlers have not found.
3) Forensics: We link 24.2K users and 202 labels to MMM, which
is one of the world’s largest Ponzi scheme. All of these users are
BitcoinTalk users who are mostly male, 20–40 years old, and located
worldwide in more than 80 countries. We found that only 313 users
have made one or more activities and engaged with the forum once
a day, on average. After further analysis, it turned out these user
accounts were created as part of the “MMM Extra” scheme, which
promises “up to 100% return per month for performing simple daily
tasks that take 5–15 min.” We also used BlockTag to retrieve and
model MMM transactions as a graph. This graph consisted of 14.3K
addresses and 32.K transactions. We found that two of the top-10
ranked addresses, in terms of their PageRank, have been flagged on
BitcoinTalk as scammer addresses. As of March 21, these addresses
has received more than B2M combined.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Research in blockchain and cryptocurrencies has gained a signif-
icant momentum over the years [7]. In what follows, we present
the background and related work and contrast it to ours.
Analysis systems. Blockchain analysis systems parse and analyze
raw transaction data for many applications. Recently, Kalodner et al.
proposed BlockSci [17], an open-source, scalable blockchain anal-
ysis system that supports various blockchains and analysis tasks.
BlockSci incorporates an in-memory, analytical database, which
makes it several hundred times faster than its contenders. While
there is a minimal support for tagging in its programming interface,
BlockSci is designed for analysis of core blockchain data. At the
cost of performance, annotation and tagging can be integrated into
the analysis pipeline through a centralized, transactional database.
For example, Spagnuolo et al. proposed BitIodine [26], an open-
source blockchain analysis system that supports tagging through
address labels. However, BitIodine, relies on Neo4j [20], a general-
purpose graph database that is not designed for blockchain data
and its append-only nature, which makes it inefficient for com-
mon blockchain analysis tasks, such as address linking. In contrast,
BlockTag is the first open-source tagging system that fills this role.
Linking. The impact of Bitcoin address linking on user anonymity
and privacy has been known for a while now [11, 14, 16, 24]. Fer-
gal and Martin [24] showed that passive analysis of public Bitcoin
information can lead to a serious information leakage. They con-
structed two graphs representing transactions and users from Bit-
coin’s blockchain data and annotated the graphs with auxiliary data,
such as user accounts from BitcoinTalk and Twitter. The authors
used visual content discovery and flow analysis techniques to in-
vestigate Bitcoin theft. Alternatively, Fleder et al. [14] explored the
level of anonymity in the Bitcoin network. The authors annotated
addresses in the transaction graph with user accounts collected
from BitcoinTalk in order to show that users can be linked to trans-
actions through their public Bitcoin addresses. These studies show
the value of using public data sources for Bitcoin privacy research
and law enforcement, which is our goal behind designing BlockTag.
Tor hidden services and black markets. Tor hidden services have
become a breeding ground for black markets, such as Silk Road and
Agora, which offer illicit merchandise and services [5, 21]. Moore
and Rid [21] studied how hidden services are used in practice, and
noted that Bitcoin was the dominant choice for accepting payments.
Although multiple studies [14, 19] showed that Bitcoin transactions
are not as anonymous as previously thought, Bitcoin remains the
most popular digital currency on the Dark Web [8], and many users
choose to use it despite its false sense of anonymity. Recent research
explored the intersection between Bitcoin and Tor privacy [3, 4],
and found that legitimate hidden service users and providers are one
class of Bitcoin users whose anonymity is particularly important.
Moreover, Biryukov et al. [5] found that hidden services devoted to
anonymity, security, human rights, and freedom of speech are as
popular as illegal services. While BlockTag makes it possible to link
users to such services, we designed it to help analysts understand
the privacy threats, identify malicious actors, and enforce the law.
Forensics. Previous research showed that cryptocurrencies, Bit-
coin in particular, have a thriving market for fraudulent services,
such as fake mining, wallets, exchanges, and Ponzi schemes [6, 28].
Recently, Bartoletti et al. [2] proposed a data mining approach to
detect Bitcoin addresses that are involved in Ponzi schemes. The
authors manually collected and labeled Bitcoin addresses from pub-
lic data sources, defined a set of features, and trained multiple
classifiers using supervised machine learning. The best classifier
correctly labelling 31 addresses out of 32 with 1% false positives.
Interestingly, MMMwas excluded because it had a complex scheme.
In concept, BlockTag complements such techniques by providing
an efficient and easy way to collect and explore data that is relevant
to the investigation. This data can be then analyzed using different
techniques with the help of existing tools [29].
3 DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
BlockTag is designed for a layered system architecture. As depicted
in Figure 1, each layer in the blockchain stack is responsible for a
separate set of tasks and can interact with other layers through pro-
grammable interfaces. We present a high-level view of BlockTag’s
design, and leave the details in the technical report.
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3.1 Tags
In BlockTag, a tag is a mapping between a block, a transaction, or
an address identifier and a list of JSON-serializable objects. Each
object specifies the type, the source, and other information rep-
resenting auxiliary data describing the tagged identifier. As raw
blockchain data is stored in a format that is efficient for validating
transactions and ensuring immutability, the datamust be parsed and
transformed it into a simple data structure that is efficient for anal-
ysis. For example, BlockSci uses a memory-mapped data structure
to represent core transaction data as a graph. All other transaction
data, such as hashes and scripts, are stored separately as mappings
that are loaded when needed. BlockTag follows this design choice,
and uses a persistent key-value database, such as RocksDB [12],
with an in-memory cache in order to store and manage blockchain
tags, as they can grow arbitrarily large in size.
BlockTag defines four types of tags, namely user, service, text,
and custom tags. A user tag represents a user account on an online
social network, such as BitcoinTalk and Twitter. A service tag rep-
resents an online service provider, such as Tor hidden services like
Silk Road and The Pirate Bay. A text tag represents a user-generated
textual label, such as address labels submitted to Blockchain.info.
A custom tag can hold arbitrary data, including other tags, and is
usually used when creating tags manually by analysts.
In BlockTag, tags are created, updated, and removed at the block,
transaction, or the address level. Listing 1 shows how to create a
user tag mapping Bitcoin’s genesis address to Satoshi’s BitcoinTalk
user account. The append flag indicates whether the value defined
in this tag should be appended to the existing list, as the address
can have other tag values defined already.
import blocktag
chain = blocktag.Blockchain('/path/to/blockchain/data/')
chain.tag(
level='address',
key='1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa',
value=[{
'type': 'user',
'source': 'bitcointalk',
'info': {
'id': 3,
'account': 'satoshi',
'num_posts': 575,
'num_activities': 364,
'position': 'founder',
'date_registered': '2009-11-19 19:12:39',
'last_seen': '2010-12-13 16:45:41'
}
}],
append=False
)
Listing 1: Creating a tag.
A direct, read-only access to tags is possible at any level through
the tags object of a block, a transaction, and an address. By default,
BlockTag returns the tag of an identifier at a given level along with
the tags of identifiers from lower levels. This means it is sufficient
to tag only addresses in order to annotate the whole blockchain.
3.2 Vertical crawlers
In BlockTag, a vertical crawler is used to scrape a data source, typi-
cally an HTML website or a RESTful API, in order to automatically
create block, transaction, or addresses tags of a particular type us-
ing a website-specific parser. A crawler can be configured to run
according to a crontab-like schedule, and to bootstrap on the first
run with previously crawled raw HTML/JSON data, which can also
be used to initialize blockchain tags. Listing 2 shows how to run a
BitcoinTalk user crawler at the address level everyday at midnight.
chain.crawl(
level='address',
config={
'type': 'user',
'source': 'bitcointalk',
'schedule': '0 0 * * *',
'data': '/path/to/bitcointalk/data/'
}
)
Listing 2: Scheduling a crawler.
BitcoinTalk is one of the most popular Bitcoin forums with more
than 2.2M users. In fact, as of July 2018, the forum contained about
42.2M posts, which makes it a good data source to collect public Bit-
coin addresses and their associated user accounts. Behind the scene,
chain.crawl() in Listing 2 spawns a crawler that downloads user
account pages through a URL that is unique for each user account.
TheHTML pages are then parsed to find Bitcoin addresses using reg-
ular expressions. As a Bitcoin address is a base58 encoded identifier
of 26–35 alphanumeric characters, beginning with the number 1 or
3, the crawler uses the regex *[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]25,34
and eventually creates or updates a user tag for the matched address.
In addition to a BitcoinTalk user crawler, BlockTag implements
a Twitter user crawler that consumes Twitter’s API, a Tor hidden
service crawler that scrapes onion landing pages of Ahmia-indexed
service providers, and a Blockchain.info text crawler that scrapes
textual labels that are self-signed by address owners or submitted
by arbitrary users. By default, the vertical crawlers create Bitcoin
address tags, but can be configured to scrape auxiliary data of other
cryptocurrencies, including Litecoin, Namecoin, and Zcash.
3.3 Query engine
BlockTag query engine is inspired fromNoSQL document databases,
such as MongoDB [9], where queries are specified using a JSON-
like structure. Selecting, grouping, and aggregating transactions is
provided through a simple query interface.
To write a query, the analyst starts with specifying block, transac-
tion, or address properties to which the results should match using
the where parameter. BlockTag treats each property as having an
implicit boolean AND. It natively supports boolean OR queries,
but the analyst should use a special $or operator to achieve it. In
addition to exact matches, BlockTag has operators for string match-
ing, numerical comparisons, etc. The analyst can also specify the
properties by which the results are grouped using the group_by pa-
rameter. Finally, the analyst can specify which properties to return
per result with the select parameter. While this query interface is
suitable for many tasks, BlockTag’s Python package also exposes
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lower-level functionality to analysts who have tasks with more
sophisticated requirements. Listing 3 shows how to finds Twitter
user accounts who paid ≥ B10.0 to Silk Road in 2014.
accounts = chain.query(
level='transaction',
select= 'input.address.tag.info.account',
where={
'input': {
'address':
'tag': {
'type': 'user',
'source': 'twitter'
}
}
},
'output': {
'address': {
'tag': {
'type': 'service',
'source': 'tor',
'info': {
'provider': { '$like': 'silkroad' }
}
}
}
},
'time': '2014'
},
group_by='input.address.tag.info.id',
having='sum(input.value) >= (10.0 * 10**7)',
clustering={ 'source': 'inputs', 'method': 'original' }
)
Listing 3: Querying a blockchain.
One important capability of BlockTag’s query engine is address
clustering [19], which can be configured to operate on a particular
source, namely inputs, outputs, or both, using one of the supported
clusteringmethods, all through the clustering parameter. Address
clustering expands the set of Bitcoin addresses that are mapped
to a unique user, service, or text tag through a technique called
closure analysis. As a result, this allows the analyst to identify more
links between different tags by considering a larger number of
transactions in the blockchain.
BlockTag supports multiple address clustering methods. The first
method is the original closure heuristic proposed by Meiklejohn
et al. [19], which works as follows: If a transaction has addresses A
and B as inputs, then A and B belong to the same cluster. The ratio-
nale behind this heuristic is that such addresses are highly likely to
be controlled by the same entity, as they are signed by the private
keys whose owner performed the transaction. While efficient, this
method can result in large clusters that include addresses which
belong to different entities, due to mixing services and CoinJoin
transactions. In order to tackle this issue, BlockTag implements
a novel minimal clustering method that prematurely terminates
the original clustering method before the clusters grow to their
maximum size. Minimal clustering includes a final trimming phase
to find clusters that share at least one address and consequently
merges them, after which they are removed. Doing so ensures that
the clusters are mutually-exclusive and likely to belong to separate
entities, but also means the clusters are smaller than usual, reducing
the chance of linking different tags as a result.
4 REAL-WORLD DEPLOYMENT
We now describe our experience in deploying BlockTag.
4.1 Ethical considerations
BlockTag’s functionality depends on tags that map blocks, transac-
tions, and addresses to user accounts, service providers, text labels,
and other types of tags. This allows BlockTag to link tags to each
other by findings blockchain transactions involving tag identifiers.
For example, it is sufficient to show a transaction from Alice’s ad-
dress to Bob’s address to link them together. Tag values represent
auxiliary data that is collected from public sources, which include
social networks, Tor hidden services, and blockchains. As such, we
are faced with two privacy-related ethical concerns, namely linking
and data collection. In what follows, we discuss the actions we took
to address them, as we worked with our institution’s IRB board to
approve BlockTag deployment.
First of all, the information gathered from anonymous cryptocur-
rency payments without linking is often limited and non-actionable
for privacy research and law enforcement. BlockTag is designed
to address this limitation, building on top of previous studies that
showed the feasibility, utility, and value of linking users through
Bitcoin transactions and public data sources [19, 23]. BlockTag does
not put users at any additional risk, but rather exposes existing
ones and corrects common misconceptions, such as Bitcoin being
a private or anonymous online payment system. When needed,
we reached out to legitimate users whose privacy is at risk, and
informed them about how their Bitcoin transactions link to their
online activities and what they can do about it. We also posted
a notice on BitcoinTalk forum concerning deanonymizating Tor
hidden service users.4
Concerning data collection, our deployment uses crawlers which
target solely public data sources. The crawlers are polite, passive,
and respect robots.txt instructions. This means we do not collect
data from sources that require authentication, payment, or email ex-
change. Also, all collected data is secured and stored on our private
infrastructure whose access is restricted to authorized researchers.
Finally, we have shared our deployment plans with a few stake-
holders in order to get an early feedback. In response, we engaged
with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, a national financial regu-
latory authority, two law firms, and an international news agency
which were interested in BlockTag and its potential for protecting
users, enforcing the law, and uncovering cyber criminals, respec-
tively. This also indicates that evidence acquired through BlockTag
is admissible in the court of law.
4.2 Setup
We deployed BlockTag on a single machine from Jan 1 to March 21,
2018. The machine was running Ubuntu v16.04.4 LTS, Bitcoin Core
v0.16.0, and BlockSci v0.5.0 on two 2GHz quad-core CPUs, 128GB
of system memory, and 2TB of network-attached storage.
4https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2602885
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# addresses
Source Type Original Clustering
BitcoinTalk User 40,970 19,213,141
Twitter User 4,183 623,189
Tor Network Service 88 –
Blockchain.info Text 29,643 –
Table 1: Summary of created tags.
We used BlockTag to tag Bitcoin’s blockchain at the address level.
As of March 2018, the crawlers have ingested nearly 5B tweets, 2.2M
BitcoinTalk profiles, 1.5K Tor onion pages, and 30K Blockchian.info
labels, resulting in 45K user, 88 service, and 29K text tags. We used
a previously collected dataset consisting of 4.8B tweets, which were
posted in 2014, to bootstrap Twitter user tags. Moreover, for the first
application where we link users to services, we configured address
clustering for inputs from user tags using the minimal clustering
method. We summarize the created tags in Table 1.
5 APPLICATIONS
We demonstrate the capabilities of BlockTag in the following.
5.1 Linking users to services
In e-crime investigations of illegal Tor hidden services, such as Silk
Road, analysts often try to link cryptocurrency transactions to user
accounts and activities. This can start with a known transaction
that is part of a crime, such as a Bitcoin payment to buy drugs on
Silk Road. Instead, a wider search criteria can be used to understand
the landscape of activities of illegal services, such as finding service
providers that receive the most payments. Either way, the analysts
need to link users to services. In BlockTag, this can be achieved in
a single query, as shown in Listing 4.
user_service_txes = chain.query(
level='transaction',
select= ['input.address.tag.info.account',
'output.address.tag.info.provider', 'self.txes'],
where={
'input': {
'address': {
'tag': { 'type': 'user' }
}
},
'output': {
'address': {
'tag': {
'type': 'service',
'source': 'tor'
}
}
}
},
group_by=['input.address.tag.info.id',
'output.address.tag.info.id'],
clustering={ 'source': 'inputs', 'method': 'minimal' }
)
Listing 4: Linking different tags via transactions.
# linked users
Name Twitter BitcoinTalk Total
WikiLeaks 11 35 46
Silk Road 4 18 22
Internet Archives 3 13 16
Snowden Defense Fund 3 8 11
The Pirate Bay 3 7 10
DarkWallet 9 1 10
ProtonMail 1 7 8
Darknet Mixer 1 2 3
Liberty Hackers 0 2 2
CryptoLocker Ransomware 1 0 1
Table 2: Top-10 linked service providers.
This resulted in linking 28 Twitter user accounts to 14 service
providers via 167 transactions and 97 BitcoinTalk user accounts to
20 service providers via 115 transactions. Some of these users were
linked to multiple service providers. In total, 125 users were linked
to 20 services. The results suggest that although Twitter users are
smaller in number compared to BitcoinTalk users, they are more
active and have a larger number of transactions with services. In
fact, some of these users are “returning customers,” as they have
performed multiple transactions with the same service provider.
Another way to present these results is from the standpoint of
services. Table 2 lists the top-10 service providers sorted by how
many users were linked to them. The list is topped by WikiLeaks,
which is a service that publishes secret information provided by
anonymous sources, with 46 linked users. This is followed by Silk
Road, the famous black market, with transactions from 22 users
whose input coins have been seized by the FBI. Although the pay-
ment address of Silk Road was seized, it still appears in transactions
until recently. However, based on further analysis, we found that a
number of transactions were performed prior to the seizure. Ranked
fifth, The Pirate Bay, which is known for infringing IP and copyright
laws by facilitating the distribution of protected digital content, was
linked to 10 users. As the linked users have accounts with various
personally identifiable information (PII), they are vulnerable to the
threat of deanonymizing their true identities. We next focus on two
case studies that illustrate this threat in more detail.
Actionable links. Purchasing products and services of black mar-
kets is generally considered illegal and calls for legal action. Some of
the 22 users who are linked to Silk Road through transactions with
seized coins shared enough PII to completely deanonymoize their
identity. For example, one user is a 16 years old male fromCrossville,
Tennessee, U.S. The user has been a registered BitcoinTalk member
since 2013, and has a transaction with Silk Road in October 2013, the
takedown year, when he was around 13 years old. The correspond-
ing user account points to his personal website, which contains
links to his user profiles on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. Even
if users do not share PII or use fake identities on their accounts,
simply having an account on social networks is enough to track
them online, or even secure a subpoena to collect identifiable infor-
mation, such as login IP addresses. For example, three out of the 18
BitcoinTalk users recently logged in to the website.
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A matter of jurisdiction. One of the users who are linked to The
Pirate Bay is a 36 years old male from Sweden. The Pirate Bay
was founded by a Swedish organization called Piratbyrån. Further-
more, the original founders of the website were found guilty in the
Swedish court for copyright infringement activities. Since then, the
website has been changing its domain constantly, and eventually
operated as a Tor hidden service. Consequently, having such a link
to The Pirate Bay through recent transactions in Sweden can lead
to legal investigation, at least, and potentially be incriminating.
5.2 Market economics
Keeping track of market statistics describing Tor hidden services
is useful for identifying thriving services, measuring the impact of
law enforcement, and prioritizing e-crime investigations. As such,
an analyst may start with calculating a financial “balance sheet” for
service providers, which typically includes the number of transac-
tions with which a service is involved (i.e., volume), the amount of
coins a service has received or sent (i.e., money flow), and the differ-
ence between the timestamps of the last and first transactions (i.e.,
operation lifetime). These statistics can be calculated in BlockTag
using two queries, as shown in Listing 5.
balance_sheet = chain.query(
level='transaction',
select= ['output.address.tag.info.provider as @name',
'count(self.txes) as volume',
'sum(input.value) as incoming',
'min(time) as first_tx',
'max(time) as last_tx',
'date_diff(max(time), min(time)) as num_days'],
where={
'output': {
'address': {
'tag': {'type':'service', 'source':'tor'}
}
}
},
group_by='output.address.tag.info.id'
)
balance_sheet.join(
results=chain.query(
level='transaction',
select= ['input.address.tag.info.provider as @name',
'sum(input.value) as outgoing'],
where={
'input': {
'address': {
'tag': {'type':'service', 'source':'tor'}
}
}
},
group_by='input.address.tag.info.id'
),
on='@name'
)
Listing 5: Calculating a balance sheet for service tags.
BlockTag supports joining queries via results.join() method
of a query’s results object. The join method operates on properties
that can be aliased and referenced across queries using the @alias
operator. In Listing 5, the two queries are joined in order to calculate
the money flow, as an address of a service tag can be an input or
an output of a transaction, depending on whether it is an incoming
or outgoing payment. Table 3 shows the market statistics for the
top-10 service providers ranked by incoming coins.
Volume. While the number of created service tags is small, the
corresponding service providers have been involved in a relatively
large number of transactions. For example, WikiLeaks tops the list
with 26.4K transactions. The Darknet Mixer, which did not make it
to the top-10 list in Table 3, has a volume of 22.1K transactions that is
greater than the remaining services combined. One explanation for
this popularity is that users are actually aware of the possibility of
linking, and try to use mixing services in order to make traceability
more difficult and improve their anonymity.
Money flow. One interesting observation is that service providers
have a nearly zero balance, which means almost the same amount of
money comes in and goes out of their addresses. This indicates that
the money is likely distributed to other addresses and is not kept
on payment-receiving addresses. One explanation for this behavior
is that by distributing funds among multiple addresses, a service
provider can reduce coin traceability. Moreover, service providers
still need to distribute their revenues among owners, sellers, and
other stakeholders. Among all service providers listed in Table 3,
Silk Road stands out with an income of B29.6K.
Lifetime. The services vary in their lifetime, ranging from two to
seven years of operation. The first transaction date does not imply
that the service provider began its operation on that date. It merely
indicates the date on which the service provider started receiving
payments through the tagged addresses. Looking at last transaction
dates, all but three services are still active in 2018. For example,
Silk Road has been receiving money since October 2013, even after
the address has been seized by the FBI and its coins auctioned for
sale by the U.S. Justice Department in June, 2014. However, a large
number of post-seizure transactions appear to be novelty tips.
5.3 Forensics
Organizations responsible for consumer protection, such as trade
commission agencies and financial regulatory authorities, have a
mandate to research and identify fraud cases involving cryptocur-
rencies, including unlawful initial coin offerings and Ponzi schemes.
Given the popularity of Ponzi schemes in Bitcoin [28, 29], we focus
on this type of fraud and show how BlockTag can help analysts
flag users who are likely victims or operators of such schemes.
A Ponzi scheme, also known as a high yield investment program,
is a fraudulent financial activity promising unusually high returns
on investment, and is named after a famous fraudster, Charles Ponzi,
from the 1920s. The scheme is designed in such a way that only
early investors will get benefits and once the sustainability of the
scheme is at risk the majority of shareholders will lose the money
they invested [1]. Among various Ponzi schemes in Bitcoin, MMM
is considered one of the largest schemes that is hard to detect solely
based on blockchain transaction analysis [2], highlighting the need
for a systematic integration of auxiliary data into blockchain analy-
sis. As such, an analyst can start the investigation with BlockTag
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Volume Flow of money (B) Lifetime (dd/mm/yyyy)
Name (# txs) Incoming Outgoing First tx Last tx # days
Silk Road 1,242 29,676.99 29,658.80 02/10/2013 19/03/2018 1,628
WikiLeaks 26,399 4,043.00 4,040.74 15/06/2011 21/03/2018 2,470
VEscudero Escrow Service 192 842.42 842.42 27/05/2012 20/08/2017 1,910
Internet Archives 2,957 775.86 746.89 06/09/2013 21/03/2018 1,656
Freenet Project 280 691.87 687.62 23/02/2011 16/03/2018 2,577
Snowden Defense Fund 1,722 218.95 218.95 11/08/2013 18/03/2018 1,680
ProtonMail 3,096 208.40 208.36 17/06/2014 18/03/2018 1,369
Ahmia Search Engine 1,423 176.51 176.50 27/03/2013 06/03/2018 1,652
DarkWallet 983 114.62 97.40 16/04/2014 02/11/2016 931
The Pirate Bay 1,214 76.80 76.80 29/05/2013 21/08/2017 1,544
Table 3: Balance sheet of top-10 service providers ranked by incoming coins.
using a full-text search query of keywords associated with MMM
scheme, such as its name, without requiring prior knowledge of who
is involved in the scheme or how it works, as shown in Listing 6.
mmm_tags = chain.query(
level='address',
select= ['self.address', 'tag.id'],
where={
'tag': {
'type': { '$in': ['user', 'text'] },
'info': { '$like': 'mmm' }
}
}
)
Listing 6: Searching for tags using keywords.
This resulted in 24.2K user accounts, all of which are BitcoinTalk
users, and 202 Blockchain.info text labels. For BitcoinTalk user ac-
counts, the full-text search matched the website property of an
account, which contained a URL pointing to the user’s profile on
MMMwebsite. As for Blockchain.info text tags, the search matched
the self-signed label property, which contained “mmm” substring,
as summarized in Table 4. We next analyze the user accounts look-
ing for clues related to MMM operation.
User demographics. Out of 24.2K users, 52.86%, 18.31%, and 12.48%
shared their gender, age, and geo-location information, respectively.
Based on this data, we found that the users are mostly male (75.44%),
between 20–40 years old (average=32), and are located worldwide
in more than 80 different countries. However, 70.69% of the users
were located in only five countries, namely Indonesia, China, India,
South Africa, and Thailand. Interestingly, most of these countries
have a corresponding MMM label, as listed partially in Table 4.
Forum activity. Weused three properties of a user account that re-
late to activity on the forum, namely, date_registered, last_seen,
and num_activities. We found that 99.44% of the users registered
on the forum between August 2015–March 2016. Moreover, 98.21%
of the users made their last activity on the forum during the same
period. This suggest that users have short-lived accounts. In fact,
we found that 94.25% of the users were active for 30 days or less, and
that 78.45% of users were dormant, meaning they were active for
Label Frequency
mmm universe.help 46
mmm global 13
bonus from mmm universe.help 9
mmm indonesia 6
mmm nusantara 4
mmm china 2
mmm india 2
mmm indonesia 2
mmm philippines 2
mmm russia 2
Table 4: Top-10 frequent MMM labels.
less than a day after registration. This also suggests that most of the
users are not engaged with the forum. Indeed, only 313 users made
at least one activity, and even for these users, they never engaged
with the forum for more than once a day, on average. After man-
ually inspecting the accounts on the website, we found that most
of them were created as part of its “MMM Extra” scheme, which
promises “up to 100% return per month for performing simple daily
tasks that take 5–15 min,” such as promoting MMM on social net-
works. This was evident from the accounts’ signatures, which the
crawler did not parse, that included messages such as “MMM Extra
is the right step towards the goal” and “MMM participants get up
to 100% per month.”
Financial operation. As tags are linked through transactions in
BlockTag, we can explore how MMM scheme operates financially
through transaction graph analysis [25]. In this analysis, Bitcoin
transactions are modeled as a weighted, directed graphwhere nodes
represent addresses, edges represent transactions, and weights rep-
resent information about transactions, such as input/output values
and dates. Analyzing the topological properties of this graph can
provide insights into which addresses are important and how the
money flows. For example, having a few “influential” nodes and a
small clustering coefficient suggest that most of the money funnels
through these nodes and does not flow back to others, which are
indicative of a Ponzi operation [2, 28, 29]. In BlockTag, an analyst
can easily model case-specific transaction graphs by linking tags
based on some search criteria, as shown in Listing 7.
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mmm_txes = chain.query(
level='transaction',
select= ['input.address.tag.id',
'output.address.tag.id', 'self.txes'],
where={
'input': {
'address': {
'tag': {
'type': { '$in': ['user', 'text'] },
'info': { '$like': 'mmm' }
}
}
},
'output': {
'address': {
'tag': {
'type': { '$in': ['user', 'text'] },
'info': { '$like': 'mmm' }
}
}
}
},
group_by=['input.address.tag.type',
'output.address.tag.type']
)
Listing 7: Linking tags based on full-text search.
Users Labels
₿1,328.33
₿90.81
Figure 2: MMM transaction graph.
We used the query in Listing 7 to model and analyze five transac-
tion graphs, one for every combination of tag types, as summarized
in Table 5. The MMM transaction graph includes addresses of any
type, and consisted of 14.3K addresses (i.e., order) and 32.5K transac-
tions (i.e., size). This graph is also sparsely connected, as suggested
by the small-sized largest strongly connected component (LSCC),
low clustering, and long distance measures. Moreover, it consists
of two subgraphs, the user→user subgraph, which is also sparsely
connected, and the label→label subgraph, which is dense and small.
Even though the two subgraphs are loosely connected through only
170 edges, an order of magnitude more money has flown from users
to labels than the reverse direction, as shown Figure 2.
To find influential nodes in the graph, we computed their PageR-
ank, whereweights represented input address values of transactions.
All of the top-10 ranked nodes were located in the user→user sub-
graph, which mapped to unique BitcoinTalk users. After manually
inspecting the corresponding accounts, we found that the first and
the third users have been reported as scammers on BitcoinTalk for
operating fraudulent services, namely Dr.BTC and OreMine.Org.
While the first user has received a total of B426.7K on her address,
the third has received a staggering total of B1.8M on his address
that is associated with Huobi wallet address, an exchange service,
suggesting that the user has exchanged the received coins.
6 DISCUSSION
In what follows, we discuss the limitations of our work and outline
our plan for current and future work.
Limitations. BlockTag’s main limitation is the validity of its tags,
since they are created automatically by crawlers from open, public
data sources. This limitation is part of a larger problem that is com-
mon with Internet content providers, such as Google and Facebook,
especially when this content is generated mostly by users [18, 30].
In general, the validity issue is especially important for user iden-
tities, as attackers and fraudsters can always create fake accounts
in order to hide their real identity [13]. While doing so improves
their anonymity, law enforcement agencies can use the links found
through BlockTag to secure a subpoena in order to collect more
information about suspects from website operators [27].
Work in progress. We are designing BlockSearch, an open-source
Google-like searching layer that sits on top of BlockTag. Block-
Search allows analysts to search blockchain for useful information
in plain English and in real-time, without having to go through the
hassle of performing low-level queries using BlockTag. The system
also provides in a dashboard for analysts that displays real-time
results of important queries, such as the ones we presented in the
paper. Based on feedback from trade commission agencies and finan-
cial regulatory authorities, such capabilities are extremely helpful
to protect customers, comply with know you customer (KYC) and
anti-money laundering (AML) laws, and draft new, investor-friendly
cryptocurrency regulations.
Future work. In order to address the main limitation of BlockTag,
we plan to define confidence scores for tag sources. The scores
can be computed using various “truth discovery” algorithms [10],
which are generally based on the intuition that the more sources
confirm a tag the more confidence is assigned to it.
BlockTag is modular by design. This means we can easily en-
hance or add new capabilities. As such, we plan to implement more
vertical crawlers for services such as WalletExplorer,5 ChainAly-
sis,6 BitcoinWhosWho,7 and Reddit.8 We also plan to support more
clustering methods and develop a systematic way to automatically
tag clusters, in addition to blocks, transactions, and addresses, based
on label propagation algorithms [15].
7 CONCLUSION
Blockchain analysis has become a hot topic among researchers and
law enforcement agencies for applications that demand more effec-
tive tools. While state-of-the-art analysis systems, such as BlockSci,
are efficient, they are not designed to annotate and analyze auxiliary
blockchain data. We presented BlockTag, an open-source tagging
system for blockchains. We used BlockTag to uncover privacy is-
sues with using Bitcoin in Tor hidden services, and flag Bitcoin
addresses that are likely to be part of a large Ponzi scheme.
5https://www.walletexplorer.com
6https://www.chainalysis.co
7https://bitcoinwhoswho.com
8https://www.reddit.com
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Largest component Clustering
Type Weakly connected Strongly connected Triangles Distance (LSCC)
Input Output Order Size #nodes #edges #nodes #edges Average #triangles %closed Diameter Radius
User User 14,227 31,819 13,914 31,631 5,850 17,498 0.11 6,566 0.08 17 7
User Label 129 125 96 103 1 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0
Label User 64 45 10 9 1 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0
Label Label 61 508 54 498 20 246 0.64 943 61.04 3 2
Any Any 14,319 32,497 14,002 32,307 5,934 18,128 0.11 7,576 0.09 17 7
Table 5: Properties of MMM transaction (sub)graphs.
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